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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a mathematical representation of the dynamic 
logic tying together coercion and noncompliance within political systems. 
Several concepts are central to the effort: system legitimacy, the long-term 
institutionalized investment of the political system in coercive resources, 
the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance, and the short­
term response of the political system to noncompliance. The analysis 
addresses a number of issues. What are the dynamic consequences of system 
legitimacy and of the political system's institutionalized investment in 
coercive resources? What are the consequences of its short-term coercive 
response to noncompliance? Under what circumstances will noncompliance be 
eliminated? Under what circumstances will it be controlled? Under what 
circumstances will political systems become overwhelmed by noncompliance? A 
central argument of this paper is that aggressive short-term responses to 
noncompliance are likely to be ineffective in controlling noncompliance, and 
they are likely to aggravate the vulnerability of political systems to mass 
noncompliance.
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Analysen in Mannheim. I am also grateful to a number of colleagues who have 
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Some laws secure broad support and compliance within political 
systems because they are fundamental to the social order. Murder, extortion, 
theft, and kidnapping are broadly conceived as socially deviant behaviors, at 
least in nonrevolutionary circumstances, and the prohibition of these 
activities generates little controversy. In contrast, most political systems 
address an entirely different set of problems with respect to the enforcement 
of unpopular laws —  laws that proscribe activities not seen as deviant by 
large parts of the population. These laws are much more controversial 
because, in one way or another, the public disputes their validity. The 
enumeration of such laws is lengthy, and forbidden activities under various 
regimes range from (1) speeding on highways and smoking marijuana to (2) 
exercising free speech and participating in political assemblies. Unpopular 
laws are distinguished not by the seriousness of the activity they forbid, but 
rather by the level of public resistance they provoke. These laws generate an 
important political dimension because they involve the clashing interests of 
citizens and political systems. They produce a potential confrontation 
between the coercive power of the state and noncompliance on the part of the 
public.
This relationship between coercion and compliance is fundamental to 
politics, and to the viability of political systems. The maintenance of order 
and the survival of political systems require large scale compliance with 
politically established norms and legal mandates, and the state's coercive
2capacity ia a central ingredient in securing compliance. Of course, citizens 
need not always be coerced, even to obey unpopular laws. Compliance is also 
secured voluntarily, absent even the threat of sanctions for noncompliance, 
and therein lies the central ingredient of system legitimacy. Furthermore, 
the coercive capacity of the state is limited, especially in democratic 
regimes, but also in political systems lacking popular control. At some level 
of noncompliance the coercive response of the state must reach its maximum and 
decline. In a democratic regime this is the very definition for popular 
control, and in a non-democratio regime it is the definition for revolution.
This paper represents the relationship between coercion and 
compliance in the form of a mathematical model. The model incorporates 
elements that are both dynamic and simultaneous in timing. The 
interdependence between coercion and compliance is viewed as a process that 
unfolds in time. Levels of coercion are preconditioned by previous levels of 
noncompliance, while levels of compliance are preconditioned by previous 
levels of coercion.
The mathematical representation is, in turn, employed to address 
several questions: Why do some efforts at enforcing unpopular laws fail, 
while others succeed? To what extent is success a function of system 
legitimacy and the response by citizens to sanctions for noncompliance? To 
what extent is success a function of the political system's long-term 
investment in coercive resources, and of its short-term coercive response to 
noncompliance? Under what circumstances can a political system obtain 
compliance with unpopular laws absent significant coercion? Finally, what are 
the strategic consequences of the limitations upon coercion as a strategy for 
securing compliance? How do these limitations affect the relationship between 
coercion and noncompliance, and the exercise of coercion by political systems?
3A Characterization of Compliance
Why do people break laws? More importantly, why do some people quit 
obeying laws, and why do others quit breaking them? First, some people obey 
laws because they are laws, regardless of any penalties that might be levied 
against law breakers, and regardless of any benefits that might be obtained 
from noncompliance. Thus, there is some limit upon noncompliance under normal 
circumstances, and this limit is defined here as L: the proportion of 
citizens who might refuse to comply with a particular law (Likens and Kohfeld, 
1983)* Legitimacy is defined as the proportion who would never break the law 
under normal circumstances, 1-L.
citizens who disobey the law at time t. It follows that the proportion of 
citizens eligible to become noncompliers at the next instant in time is equal
currently obeying it. Thus L is defined as being fixed in time, while N. 
varies through time. (In the dynamic representations of this paper, time 
subscripts are maintained on system states to emphasize the fact that they 
vary with time, and to call attention to the time invariant model parameters. 
All rates of change are instantaneous, however, and no time delays are built 
into the system.)
law abiding citizens are more willing to become lawbreakers to the extent that 
breaking a particular law is profitable, and the profitability of breaking a 
particular law is conceived as being constant in time (a). This is not to say 
that profitability is constant across crimes or across individuals. It is 
generally more profitable to break a speed law on a trip across Wyoming than
Who then might become noncompliers? Let Nfc denote the proportion of
proportion of citizens who might break the law, but who are
Compilers become noncompliers for two interdependent reasons: First,
it is to break a speed law on a trip to the grocery. Similarly it is more 
profitable for the employee who is late for work to break a speed law than it 
is for the employee who is on time. Thus the profitability of noncompliance 
(a) is defined as an average within a population relative to a particular law.
Profitability derives from numerous sources: some rioters steal 
color televisions from department stores in order to enjoy football games, 
while others enjoy the release of pent-up fury, while still others view their 
involvement as an instrumental act aimed at bringing down an oppressive 
political system. Indeed, economic analyses of compliance occupy a prominent 
place in the literature on crime and deterrence. A seminal work is that of 
Becker (1968), in which he argues that ". . .  a useful theory of criminal 
behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological 
inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend the 
economist's usual analysis of choice0 (p. 170).
Profitability is not the only reason that law abiding citizens become 
law breakers, however. The individual level transformation from obeying to 
breaking the law is also more likely to occur if the general level of 
noncompliance is higher. Two different micro-level premises support this 
assertion. First, the rationally calculating, football-loving rioter might 
decide that it is safer to steal the television if many other people are 
stealing televisions, stereos and so forth. That is, the probability of 
individual apprehension decreases as the aggregate level of noncompliance 
increases (Granovetter, 1978). Thus, a social choice interpretation of 
individual behavior can be called upon to support the assertion that people 
are more likely to disobey a law to the extent that others also disobey the 
law.
5Second, the importance of aggregate noncompliance for the individual 
decision to disobey a law might also be supported on the basis of a social 
structural interpretation of individual behavior. Some forms of noncompliance 
may be furthered through social interaction and social persuasion, and in 
these instances aggregate noncompliance is important as a source of social 
influence. At one extreme, revolutionary success requires revolutionary 
solidarity, and thus the revolution proceeds (diffuses) as revolutionaries are 
able to convert nonrevolutionaries. At some point, even many unwilling 
revolutionaries may be swept along by the social tide as the level of 
revolutionary activity increases. (For complementary analyses see Przeworski 
197*J, Tilly 1978, and DeNardo 1985: ^5-^6.)
Barry (1970) and Salert (1976) show that considerable difficulties 
occur when collective revolutionary activity is conceived in terms of 
individually based, maximizing behavior in the tradition of Olson (1971).
These problems do not affect the present representation, however. The form of 
the model allows for either a social choice interpretation, or a social 
structure interpretation. One or the other will be more or less appropriate 
depending upon the form of noncompliance being considered. The important 
point is that both sets of micro-level premises support the importance of 
aggregate noncompliance as a factor affecting the individual's decision 
regarding compliance.
These two factors —  profitability and aggregate noncompliance —  are 
combined interactively as a product to form a rate at which compilers become 
noncompliers: aN^. And thus the increase in noncompliance is defined as: 
aNt(L - Nt).
Why do law breakers become law abiding citizens? They respond to the 
coercive sanctions of the state, either because they are apprehended and
6punished, or because they fear such apprehension. These coercive sanctions 
may usefully be conceived as two separate components: the resources available 
to the coercive apparatus, and the effectiveness of the coercive apparatus.
For example, Tsar Nicholas I invested heavily in coercive resources to silence 
the Decembrists and other political critics, but the effort was undermined by 
the ineffectiveness of the coercive apparatus. The effectiveness of the 
state's coercive effort is determined by a variety of factors: corruption 
within the system, institutional inefficiency, constitutional safeguards for 
citizens, and in the case of Russia's Third Section, the assignment of 
mutually contradictory and impossible tasks (Monas, 1961). These factors tend 
to be deeply ingrained within particular political systems, and thus 
effectiveness is treated as being constant in time with respect to a 
particular law (b).
In contrast, coercive resources are highly variable across time. A 
typical short-term response to higher levels of noncompliance is additional 
investment in coercive resources. Thus, coercive resources are defined 
relative to time as and the rate at which noncompliers become compilers is 
defined as an interaction between these two factors, written as the simple 
product: This means, in turn, that the decrease in noncompliance is
represented as: bP^ N^ ..
As the works of Gurr (1970: chap. 8) and Salert and Sprague (1980) 
demonstrate, the public is not always encouraged to comply by increased levels 
of coercion. Increased coercion is capable of provoking outrage rather than 
restraint, thereby producing increased levels of noncompliance. This 
possibility generates important analytic consequences, but the focus of the 
present effort is upon variations in the response of the political system to 
noncompliance, rather than variations in the response of citizens to coercion.
7Exploring both types of variations simultaneously lies beyond the bounds of 
this paper, and the present effort must be understood subject to the 
assumption that noncompliance is discouraged by increased coercion.
In summary, the net rate of change in noncompliance relative to time
(dN^/dt) is represented as the increase in noncompliance minus the decrease in 
noncompliance, or:
dNt/dt = aNt(L-Nt) - bPtNt. (1)
A Characterization of Coercion
What factors give rise to changes in the resource level devoted by 
the political system to coercion? Two are addressed here: the political 
system's response to noncompliance, and the political system's coercive 
resource potential.
How does the political system respond to noncompliance? The typical 
short-term response of the coercive apparatus is to increase the level of 
resources devoted to coercion: as noncompliance increases, so do coercive 
resources. When the police chief, or the F.B.I, director, or the head of the 
secret police is faced with higher levels of law breaking, a first response is 
to increase resources in an effort to enforce the law. Different political 
systems demonstrate different levels of sensitivity toward noncompliance, and 
sensitivity varies across different laws. Thus the marginal effect of 
noncompliance upon the coercive response of the law enforcement agency varies 
in magnitude but it is always positive. This effect upon the law enforcement 
agency may be written as/ dN^, where d^characterizes the level of sensitivity 
shown by a particular political eystem"toward a particular crime.
The normal response of the law enforcement agency is, however, always 
mediated by the larger political system, and by the magnitude of
8noncompliance. Consider the case of marijuana laws: as marijuana law 
violations increase, efforts to enforce those laws increase as well, but at 
some point further coercive efforts become unfeasible. And thus, at some 
times and in some places, the enforcement effort is overwhelmed and aborted: 
a vivid example being rock concerts after the mid 1960s.
Interesting evidence along these lines comes from the work of 
Kuklinski and Stanga (1979). In a convincing analysis of California superior 
courts they show that sentencing severity in county marijuana cases changed as 
a function of the county vote in a state-wide marijuana initative. Counties 
that voted more heavily to remove criminal penalties for the personal use of 
marijuana were likely to realize reduced sentencing severity on the part of 
superior court judges. From the available evidence it is impossible to 
determine whether this relationship is due to (1) the potential for 
noncompliance, or (2) reduced levels of legitimacy. The important point is 
that the political system regularly intervenes to retreat from the enforcement 
of its own laws as the direct result of public behavior that undermines the 
enforcement effort.
Once again, it is important to make clear the point that such a 
retreat is not only relevant to laws that are peripheral to the survival of 
political systems. Even repressive regimes come up against limits in their 
ability to enforce unpopular laws, even when the laws are central to the 
continuation of the regime. (Witness the recent examples of South Korea, and 
the Phillipines under Marcos.) As a limiting case, even the most repressive 
regime can no longer enforce repressive laws when no one is willing to operate 
the instruments of repression.
In summary, mass noncompliance is capable of producing less rather 
than more coerciveness on the part of the political system, and thus it is
9reasonable to define a noncompliance saturation factor. At levels of 
noncompliance below the saturation point, M, higher levels of noncompliance 
produce more coercion, albeit at a decreasing rate. At levels of 
noncompliance above the saturation point, higher levels of noncompliance 
produce lower levels of coercion at an increasing rate. Thus M measures a 
system's insulation from noncompliance: Low levels for M indicate a political 
system that is easily saturated by noncompliance. High levels for M indicate 
a political system that is not easily dissuaded from its effort to enforce 
compliance —  a system that can withstand high levels of noncompliance without 
being saturated and forced to abort its enforcement effort.
This is not to suggest that mass noncompliance always leads to a 
decrease in coerciveness —  one has only to recall the practice of the 
Pinochet regime in imprisoning thousands of its opponents in a soccer stadium. 
At the same time, however, even the most repressive regimes are likely to have 
at least theoretical limits to their coercive potential. There is a point of 
noncompliance beyond which the state must retreat from its efforts to enforce 
its own laws, and thus it must constrain the efforts of the law enforcement 
agencies. As a practical matter, for many regimes, these limits may lie 
beyond the realm of the probable. In terms of the model being constructed 
here, M might be very large.
These observations may be combined into the following symbolic 
representation of the general effect of noncompliance upon the rate at which 
coercive resources change: dNt(M-Nt), where H characterizes the level of 
noncompliance that saturates the capabilities of the system, and d denotes the 
sensitivity of the political system to noncompliance. Thus, the general 
effect of noncompliance is specified as being the interdependent product of
10
(1) the normal response of law enforcement agencies to noncompliance, and (2) 
the political system's noncompliance saturation point.
The parameter M is measured in the same metric as N • As n 
approaches M from below, the effect on coercion goes from positive to zero.
As N(. becomes increasingly larger than M, the effect on coercion becomes 
increasingly negative. The size of M is crucial: Democratic regimes and laws 
that are peripheral to the survival of political systems lead to small values 
for M, while totalitarian regimes and laws crucial to a system's survival lead 
to large values. If all else is equal, democratic systems should be 
overwhelmed by lower levels of noncompliance. Breaking a law is, in a sense, 
another form of political expression and democracies are by definition more 
responsive to popular control. Similarly, if all else is equal, noncompliant 
behavior which threatens the survival of a regime will produce larger values 
for M. Thus, just as with d, M is crime or offense specific.
The coercive response of the political system is not only constrained 
by mass behavior, it is also constrained by the availability of resources. No 
political system has unlimited resources, and the coercive function of the 
political system must compete with other functions for the resources that are 
available. Borrowing from the vocabulary of the budgeting literature, 
political systems develop conceptions of "fair shares" in the distribution of 
resources (Wildavsky, 1974). All else being equal, an agency or function that 
receives more than Its "fair share" will have its allocation lowered, and one 
that receives less will have its allocation raised.
The level of attentiveness to resource shares is likely to vary 
across political systems and functions. A political system that is fiscally 
strained must pay great heed to fair shares because it cannot afford to do 
otherwise. At the same time, a system that is very aggressive in its
11
attitudes toward law enforcement will be less likely to pay much attention to 
fair shares when the coercive function is being considered.
These observations are summarized as a resource strain factor, and 
the effect of resource strain upon the rate at which coercive resources change 
may be represented as: f(S-Pt), where S characterizes the equilibrium level of 
resources devoted to coercion in the absence of noncompliance, and f indexes 
the resource sensitivity of the political system as it affects law 
enforcement.
The status of S requires extended attention. Because S is the 
equilibrium level of coercive resources absent noncompliance, it is directly - 
interpreted as the coercive function's fair share of political system 
resources, determined internally by the political system. That is, S 
represents a fundamental, enduring, before the fact committment to the 
coercive function on the part of the political system. And thus S is 
accurately defined as the system's investment in preemptive coercion. For 
some laws S will be very high, and for others it will be very low. A system's 
investment in preemptive coercion also depends upon the nature of the system: 
open societies spend less on preemptive coercion than closed societies.
The importance of S as a practical matter is largely a function of f. 
Larger values of f —  higher levels of resource sensitivity or resource strain
—  make it (1) more difficult for to exceed S, and (2) lead to faster 
returns toward S in the event that Pt is pushed above S by higher levels of 
noncompliance. (See Cortes Przeworski, and Sprague (197^) and Huckfeldt 
(1983) for discussions of response time and system memory.)
This description of the coercive logic may be summarized in three 
statements. First, the normal short-term response by law enforcement agencies 
to higher levels of noncompliance is an increased effort to enforce the law.
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Second, this normal response is mediated by the larger political system, so 
that increases in noncompliance beyond some saturation point force the 
political system to curtail its enforcement effort. Third, political systems 
establish basic, long-term committments of resources to the coercive function, 
and they make some attempt to keep short-term expenditures in line with those 
allocations.
These statements are translated into a mathematical form as: dP,/dt = 
where dPt/dt is the instantaneous change in coercive resources relative 
to time and Rfc denotes the time dependent rate operating upon coercive 
resources. This rate may be, in turn, expressed as an additive function of 
resource strain and the short-term response to noncompliance. Thus,
dPt/dt = tf(S-Pt) + dNt(M-Nt)]Pt. (2)
The logic of the dynamic interdependence between coercion and 
compliance is contained in Eqs. 1 and 2. The mathematical form of this 
argument lies in a social science tradition that traces to Richardson's (1960) 
analysis of arms races (also see: Gillespie, Zinnes, Tahim, Schrodt, and 
Rubison, 1977), and a life science tradition that traces to the early work of 
Lotka and Volterra and the more recent and very useful work of Rosenzweig and 
MacArthur (1963)» Rosenzweig (1969), Maynard Smith (1974), May (197*0 and 
Gilpin (1975). Because the model's systems states are coupled in their 
movement through time, the model must be analyzed in a manner taking account 
of this simultaneity.
The Analytic Framework
A framework is established in this section for the analysis of the 
model. First, system equilibria are defined for the relationship between
13
coercion and noncompliance. Second, a method is outlined for determining 
dynamics and stability in the relationship between coercion and noncompliance.
A central conceptual device for a dynamic system such as that 
portrayed in Eqs. 1 and 2 is equilibrium: the point at which change is 
absent, both in terms of coercion and in terms of noncompliance. A systematic 
consideration of various equilibria is furthered by restating the model as: 
dNt/dt = [a(L-Nt) - bPt]Nt (3)
dPfc/dt = [f(S-Pt) + dMNt - dNt2JPt. (U)
First notice that if P^ is set to zero, then dP^/dt equals zero as 
well. What happens to Nfc? it converges toward L, and thus a first 
equilibrium is seen to be: E.j = (l ,0), the point at which coercion is absent and 
anyone who might disobey the law does indeed disobey. Similarly, a second 
equilibrium is easily seen to be: E2=(o,S), the point at which noncompliance 
is absent and coercion tracks to S. Finally, note that a third equilibrium
is: E^siOjO). This is perhaps the formal statement for Eden —  no one has 
thought to break the law, and no one else has considered the need to enforce
All three equilibria are degenerative in the sense that one or both 
system states reach zero. E^  through signify (1) runaway noncompliance in 
the absence of coercion, (2) the preemptive level of coercion in the absence 
of noncompliance, and (3) Eden —  full compliance without coercion. While all 
of these qualify as equilibria, all might also be .unstable. In terms of the 
first equilibrium (E^) it is highly unlikely that a political system would 
continue to tolerate noncompliance with important laws, unless the political 
system had been overwhelmed by noncompliance and forced to abort its 
enforcement effort. Indeed, if this equilibrium is_ stable, it signifies that 
a political system's effort to enforce its law has failed.
Many political systems aspire toward alternatives that lie between
these three degenerative equilibria, where coercion and noncompliance are
balanced in a manner that may be either durable or tenuous. These alternative
equilibria are located by setting Eqs. 3 and 4 to zero (dP /dt = dN./dt = 0),
t t
and by rearranging the result to obtain:
Pt = (a/b)L - (a/b)N* (5)
P* = S + (d/f)MNt . (d/f)Nt2- (6)
Eq, 5 defines a straight line which yields equilibrium in _ symbolized as
N*. Eq. 6 defines a quadratic which yields equilibrium in P _ defined as
P*. Both equations are defined in the same plane, and any point of 
intersection satisfies the equilibrium conditions for both Nf and P*. That 
is, a point of intersection yields a system equilibrium.
In order to maintain the interpretation of the model, all parameters 
must be positively valued and this in turn maintains system motion in the 
first (positively valued) quadrant of the N,P plane —  the only quadrant that 
provides meaningful values for the system states. This is no assurance, 
however, that an intersection actually occurs within the first quadrant. 
Indeed, the scenarios which follow show that zero, one, or two such 
intersections may occur, and these intersections may either produce (locally) 
stable equilibria, or thresholds which demarcate stability from instability.
The implication is clear: if an intersection does not occur then a 
nonzero equilibrium is nonexistent and either noncompliance or coercion will 
be driven from the system. Alternatively, if an intersection does occur, it 
may or may not provide a stable balance between coercion and noncompliance.
Thus it is important to develop a technology that allows a 
determination of system motion in the N,P plane (Maynard Smith, 1968; 
Huckfeldt, Kohfeld, and Likens, 1982). Figure 1a graphs the N* equilibrium
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line of Eq. 5, and Figure 1b graphs the Pf equilibrium line of Eq. 6. The 
trajectories shown in Figure 1a illustrate that first quadrant movement in 
is always in the direction of the N* equilibrium line, and Figure 1b 
illustrates that first quadrant movement in P iS always in the direction of 
the P* equilibrium line. Thus, simultaneous motion in P and N can be 
determined by taking account of both the vertical and horizontal "pulls" of 
each equilibrium line. In this manner the process can be allowed to unfold in 
time, where time is represented as a path in the N,P plane. (See the appendix 
for a more systematic development.)
Several other features of Figure 1 require attention because they 
serve as the basis for the analysis that follows. The N* equilibrium line 
intersects the P axis at: (a/b)L, and it intersects the N axis at: L. The P* 
equilibrium line intersects the P axis at: S. It intersects the N axis at two 
points, but only one point lies above zero: [M + J M2 + i|fS/d ]/2. Finally, 
the P* equilibrium line reaches its maximum in P when: N=M/2. These features 
of the equilibrium lines allow the development of several different scenarios, 
and the derivation of several results regarding the dynamics of coercion and 
noncompliance. The first scenario is concerned with the potential success of 
preemptive strategies in efforts to control noncompliance.
The Potential for Preemptive Success
This analysis begins by considering two scenarios, both of which 
might result in a successful preemptive strategy for eliminating 
noncompliance. In one scenario the preemptive strategy always succeeds but in 
the other it might fail, for reasons that are not entirely obvious. These two 
scenarios are shown in Figure 2. In Part A of the Figure there is no 
intersection between the two equilibrium lines. Thus a nonzero equilibrium is
Figure 1. Movement in the N,P plane.
A. Relative to the N* equil ibrium line
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not present, and motion in the system is toward: E ^ = ( q ,s ). That is, 
noncompliance is driven out of the system, and coercion is maintained at its 
preemptive, fair share equilibrium. An intersection is present in Part B of 
the figure, but it is unstable, producing a threshold effect. Levels of 
noncompliance and coercion within a particular subarea of the plane produce 
runaway noncompliance and the demise of the coercive effort. Levels of 
noncompliance which lie outside this area produce movement toward E^f and the 
elimination of noncompliance. The alternatives in this second scenario are 
either the complete elimination of noncompliance or runaway noncompliance, and 
only slight differences in initial conditions or minor exogenous shocks to the 
system might determine the result.
What do the two scenarios share in common? In both instances:
S > (a/b)L. (7)
And it can be shown that this condition must hold if noncompliance is to be 
completely eliminated. This means that a political system is more likely to 
drive out noncompliance by (1) investing heavily in preemptive coercion (S), 
and (2) increasing the effectiveness of its enforcement activity (b). The 
potential for eliminating noncompliance is also furthered by: (1) a smaller 
proportion of citizens who are potentially willing to break the law (L), and
(2) a lower level of profit (a) from noncompliance.
What is different about the two scenarios? In the first,
[M + 4fS/d ]/2 > L. (8)
In the second scenario this inequality is reversed. First notice that Ineq. 8 
must hold if M is greater than L —  if the noncompliance saturation point lies 
beyond the potential level of noncompliance. Thus, as legitimacy increases 
(as L decreases), and as the ability to withstand noncompliance increases, so 
does the potential for eliminating noncompliance. Indeed, a guarantee of
Figure 2. Preemptive strategies.
Noncompliance (N)
B. Problematic success with threshold
Noncompliance (N)
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total compliance can be written wholly in terms of: preemptive coercion, 
coercion effectiveness, noncompliance profitability, system legitimacy, and 
the system’s noncompliance saturation point. This guarantee leaves out any 
consideration of the political system's short-term response to noncompliance 
(f and d).
Can the preemptive strategy be guaranteed to succeed (can Ineq. 8 be 
satisfied) if potential noncompliance (L) exceeds the noncompliance saturation 
point (M)? Possibly, but herein lies an irony: the potential for 
consistently eliminating noncompliance is furthered by exercising restraint in 
the short-term response to noncompliance! Notice that Ineq. 8 is more likely 
to be satisfied if f grows in size and d declines in size. But this means 
that the preemptive strategy is more likely to succeed if the political system 
is unwilling or unable to increase its level of coercive resources above its 
fair share level, and if the system is less responsive to noncompliance in the 
short-term. (For interesting and complementary results generated using a 
different model and different assumptions see Salert and Sprague, 1980.)
Why? The exercise of coercion is risky business because it has 
inherent built-in limitations. Political systems that are willing and able to 
respond aggressively to noncompliance run the inherent risk of making 
themselves more vulnerable to the noncompliance saturation point. In graphic 
terms, the P* line declines more rapidly after reaching its maximum, and thus 
it is more likely to intersect with the N* line, producing a threshold.
In summary, the preemptive strategy is more likely to succeed in 
eradicating noncompliance if the political system invests heavily in a 
sustained fair share for the coercive apparatus, but then exercises restraint 
in its short-term response to noncompliance. Not only can such a political 
system afford patience, but patience pays its own dividends.
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Controlling Noncompliance without Preemption
A successful preemptive strategy imposes potentially significant 
costs, especially in political systems with low levels of legitimacy (high L), 
and where the profitability of noncoopliance (a) Is high. First, the burden 
of a large resource share for the coercive apparatus must be maintained. 
Second, and perhaps more important, many people do not find it congenial to 
live in a police state, even if the coercive apparatus does exercise restraint 
in its response. The question then arises: what are the prospects for 
controlling noncompliance, absent a preemptive strategy?
The absence of a preemptive strategy may be represented formally by 
reversing Ineq. 7 so that:
(a/b)L > S. (9)
In words, the preemptive strategy is abortive if the fair share for coercion 
is less than potential noncompliance weighted by the ratio of noncompliant 
profitability to coercion effectiveness. Statements such as these are, of 
course, relative. It is possible to pursue a preemptive strategy with only a 
small level of S, so long as L is also very small. Conversely, it may not be 
possible to pursue the preemptive strategy even if S is very large, depending 
upon the magnitude of L.
The absence of a preemptive strategy has at least two consequences 
that not a few law abiding citizens might find congenial: (1) lower taxes, or 
more resources for other functions of the political system, and (2) the 
potential for a more open society. Is such a society doomed to rampant 
lawlessness?
Two scenarios, both of which either forsake or fail to attain the 
preemptive strategy, are shown in Figure 3. In Part A of the figure a stable
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equilibrium is attained between coercion and noncompliance. Any displacement 
away from this equilibrium is self-extinguishing. While noncompliance is not 
driven out of the system, it is contained at a level somewhere between 
complete compliance (N*=0), and the maximum possible level of noncompliance 
(N*=L).
In contrast, Part B of Figure 3 shows runaway noncompliance and the 
demise of the coercive effort. Noncompliance reaches its maximum level and 
coercive resources go to zero. At best (or worst) this signifies that the 
political system has given up enforcing an unpopular law. At worst (or best) 
it signifies the complete unravelling of the political system.
Ineq. 9 holds for both scenarios. How are the scenarios different? 
In the first instance of the stable equilibrium, where noncompliance is 
successfully controlled, it is the case that:
[M + ¡,fS/d -j/2 > L. (10)
A reversal of Ineq. 10 will not necessarily produce the pattern of runaway 
compliance shown in Figure 3b; an alternative outcome, shown below in Figure 
•4, might also be obtained. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe 
that Ineq. 10 guarantees a stable equilibrium.
Recall that Ineq. 10 is the same condition that separated the 
consistently successful preemptive strategy from the preemptive strategy 
where success was both problematical and fragile. As before, success is 
guaranteed if M > L: if the point of noncompliance saturation is greater than 
the highest possible level of noncompliance, thereby making saturation 
impossible. And as before, restraint in the short-term response to 
noncompliance is the best policy. Even if L > M, restraint in the short run 
may be sufficient to generate stability. In mathematical terms, such 
restraint may be sufficient to satisfy Ineq. 10.
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Figure 3. Non-preemptive strategies.
A. Consistent success
Noncompliance (N )
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The important point is as follows: if a system's point of 
noncompliance saturation (M) exceeds the highest possible level of 
noncompliance that might be experienced (L), then either a preemptive or a 
non-preemptive strategy will be successful. The preemptive strategy will 
drive noncompliance out of the system, and the non-preemptive strategy will 
control noncompliance at some intermediate level. If this inequality is 
reversed, if L exceeds M, then the political system is generally well advised 
to exercise great restraint in its response to noncompliance. The dynamic 
logic of both scenarios suggests that runaway noncompliance might be avoided 
if the short-term response of the political system is restrained. An 
aggressive response only serves to make the political system more vulnerable 
to the noncompliance saturation point.
Desperate Stratesies for Desperate Circumstances
Does it ever make good sense for the political system to react 
aggressively to noncompliance? To continue with the scenario of Figure 3b, 
suppose that the potential for noncompliance (L) is so much larger than the 
noncompliance saturation point (M) that no amount of patience and restraint 
can remedy the situation and bring noncompliance under control. What is a 
police chief to do?
First notice that this situation (M«L) suggests a political system 
with profound difficulties. It means that either (1) legitimacy is very low, 
or that (2) the system is very vulnerable to even minor levels of 
noncompliance. Fortunately or unfortunately, such situations are not rare 
events because vulnerability and legitimacy are likely to be inversely 
correlated. As citizens become increasingly willing to break the law, they
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also become less willing to see the political system enforce it. Thus, as L 
increases, M decreases, and vice versa.
These considerations lead to a final scenario, depicted in Figure 4. 
The two inequalities that generated Figure 3b hold for this figure as well.
In graphic terms, the difference between the two figures lies in the height of 
the hump for the P* equilibrium line. In Figure 3b its maximum lies below the 
N* equilibrium line, but in Figure *1 its maximum lies above the N* equilibrium 
line, and thus two equilibria are produced.
As Figure shows, the left hand side equilibrium is locally stable, 
so that displacements in its neighborhood produce movement back toward 
equilibrium. The right hand side equilibrium is inherently unstable: any 
displacement away from this equilibrium leads either to the left hand side 
equilibrium or to the demise of coercion and runaway noncompliance. Thus, the 
second equilibrium produces a threshold that lies between successful control 
of noncompliance on the one hand and system degeneration on the other. In 
this case, as in the threshold phenomenon of Figure 2b, initial conditions 
become profoundly important. For example, if a new law is passed, initial 
levels of compliance may very well determine whether the law can be 
successfully enforced, or whether runaway noncompliance is the inevitable 
result (Likens and Kohfeld, 1983). Similarly, initial levels of enforcement 
activity may very well determine whether the enforcement effort succeeds or 
fails.
Furthermore, these models are deterministic, but reality includes a 
stochastic component that produces random variation In time paths. Thus, a 
deterministic trajectory that is headed toward a stable equilibrium may be 
pushed over the threshold by a random event, thereby leading to runaway 
noncompliance and failure on the part of the enforcement effort. In summary,
Figure 4. Non-preemptive strategy: Problematic success with threshold.
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while the political system of Figure H is better situated than the political 
system of Figure 3b, the advantage may not be enormous, and the degenerative 
outcome may be the same. (For several interesting discussions of threshold 
phenomena see Schelling 1978.)
What separates Figure 4 from Figure 3b? A double equilibrium must be 
produced if the maximum value of P for the P* equilibrium line lies above the 
N* equilibrium line along a line drawn perpendicular to the N axis. This will 
be the case if:
S + dM2/Uf > a(2L-M)/2b (11)
The left hand side of Ineq. 11 is the maximum value of P obtained by the P* 
equilibrium line, where the maximum in P is obtained at: N=M/2. The right 
hand side of Ineq. 11 is the value of P obtained by the N* equilibrium line at 
the same value of N —  M/2. Ineq. 11 is not the general condition for the 
existence of intersections between the two equilibrium lines. It is possible 
for intersections to occur even when Ineq. 11 is not satisfied. However, as L 
becomes increasingly larger than M —  as circumstances become more desperate 
for a political system —  it becomes increasingly unlikely that intersections 
will occur unless Ineq. 11 is satisfied.
Several features of Ineq. 11 merit attention. First, notice that 
this condition reverses many of the conditions that produced the present 
predicament. For example, higher levels of preemptive coercion help to 
satisfy the inequality, but a low level of preemptive coercion relative to 
system legitimacy, is largely responsible for producing this desperate 
scenario. All of which is to indicate that, by definition, this condition is 
only likely to be satisfied in a political system where legitimacy is very 
low, and levels of preemptive coercion are correspondingly high —  a political 
system that is both desperate and repressive. Second, notice that Ineq. 11 is
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more likely to be satisfied by increasing d and reducing f: by responding 
aggressively to noncomplianee in the short-term, and by allowing flexibility 
in the fair share for coercive resources.
In short, the last hope for desperate leaders in desperate 
circumstances is to respond in an aggressive fashion to noncompliance, both in 
the long-term and in the short-term. But the benefits of such a strategy must 
be seen within the desperate context that made it beneficial, and the tenuous 
situation that is produced even if the strategy is successful.
Conclusion
This effort has drawn a distinction between long-term and short-term 
responses to noncompliance. A political system*s level of preemptive coercion
—  coercive resources in the absence of noncompliance —  constitutes a long­
term response, either to noncompliance, or to the potential for noncompliance. 
It represents the enduring commitment that a political system makes, 
independent of particular noncompliance levels, to coercion as a device for 
securing compliance. The resulting magnitude of the coercive apparatus must 
be acknowledged as a central feature of any society. In this sense it 
represents a central institutional ingredient within political systems.
This long-term response is usefully contrasted to a short-term 
response: the actual level of resources committed to enforcement activities 
in response to changing levels of noncompliance. Short-term responsiveness 
depends both upon the fiscal capacities of the political system, and upon 
system aggressiveness in responding to noncompliance. The short-term response 
is likely to be most pronounced for systems that are: (1) willing and able to 
exercise flexibility in adjusting coercive resources, and (2) aggressive in 
response to increased levels of noncompliance.
The analysis undertaken here produces a nonobvious result: short­
term restraint coupled with long-term aggressiveness offers the best potential 
for eliminating noncompliance. That is, only a preemptive strategy can 
succeed in eradicating noncompliance, and such a strategy is furthered by 
exercising short-term restraint in response to noncompliance. Short-term 
aggressiveness has the unintended consequence of making the political system 
more vulnerable to its point of noncompliance saturation, and hence more 
likely to be overwhelmed by noncompliance.
Furthermore, even in situations where a preemptive strategy is not 
pursued, short-term restraint will generally afford the best strategy for 
controlling noncompliance at some intermediate level. Only under the most 
desperate circumstances, in situations where a political system is both 
vulnerable to noncompliance and suffering from a low level of legitimacy, do 
increased levels of short-term aggressiveness pay any dividends. And even in 
these situations, the success of the strategy is problematic.
Finally, under some circumstances short-term restraint is guaranteed 
to result in the successful control of noncompliance. In political systems 
distinguished by high levels of legitimacy and by an ability to withstand high 
levels of noncompliance, short-term restraint is certain to keep noncompliance 
within manageable bounds, regardless of whether a system pursues a preemptive 
or nonpreemptive long-term strategy.
In summary, this analysis has important consequences for democratic 
prospects. Not only does it suggest that short-term coercive restraint is 
likely to pay practical dividends, but it also suggests that noncompliance 
with unpopular laws might be controlled without a fundamental institutional 
committment to excessive levels of preemptive coercion. The success of such 
restraint depends, inevitably, upon the system’s level of legitimacy. But
increasing legitimacy is not an impossible task for democratic systems. 
Indeed, it should be one of the things they do best.
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Appendix
This appendix gives more detailed attention to Figure 1, the 
graphical framework for determining motion in the N,P plane. Each equilibrium 
line demonstrates the set of points at which a system state, considered 
separately, must be at rest. Taken together, any intersection provides a 
point where both states must be at rest.
Define two functions Rp and hr, and recall that coercion is at 
equilibrium when:
Rp = gS - gP + dMN - dN2 = 0, 
and noncompliance is at equilibrium is at equilibrium when:
Rn = aL - aN - bP = 0.
These functions do not only determine equilibria, however, they also determine 
the direction of change in the respective system states. When R^ or Rn is 
less than zero, a decrease is produced in the corresponding system state.
When Rp Qr Rn is greater than zero an increase is produced in the 
corresponding system state.
In the discussion that follows, each equilibrium line is at first 
considered separately to determine the effect of deviations from the 
equilibrium line upon one dimensional movement in the phase plane. The area 
above and to the right of the noncompliance equilibrium line contains points 
that are higher on either P or N, thereby producing a negative Rq and a 
decrease in noncompliance. Correspondingly, the area below and to the left 
contains points that are lower on either P or N, thereby producing a positive 
Rn and an increase in noncompliance. Thu3, horizontal movement in the N,P 
plane —  change in the level of noncompliance —  is attracted toward the 
noncompliance equilibrium line.
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Calculating movement in the vertical direction —  change in 
noncompliance —  is more complex due to the nonlinearity of the coercion 
equilibrium line. As a first step consider change in R^ with respect to N:
¿Rp/DN = dM - 2dN.
From this it follows that the effect of N is fundamentally transformed at: 
N=M/2. Increased levels of N below the maximum contribute toward positive 
•change in P, and decreased levels contribute toward negative change in P. 
Conversely, increased levels of N above the maximum contribute toward negative 
change in P, and decreased levels contribute toward positive change. In 
contrast to the effect of N, increased values for P always contribute toward 
negative change in N, and decreased levels always contribute toward positive 
change.
As a second step it is useful to divide the P* equilibrium line 
vertically at its maximum: N=M/2. Now consider the area above the equilibrium 
line and to the left of the its maximum. This area contains points that are 
either higher on P or lower on N than the points on the equilibrium line, and 
this produces a decrease in P. The area above the equilibrium line and to the 
right of the maximum contains points that are either higher on P or higher on 
N than the points on the equilibrium line, and this also produces a decrease 
in P. The area below the equilibrium line and to the left of the maximum 
contains points that are either lower on P or higher on N, producing an 
increase in P. And finally the area below the eqijilibrium line and to the 
right of the maximum contains points that are either lower on P or lower on N, 
also producing an increase in P. Taken together, this all means that vertical 
motion above the coercion equilibrium line is downward, and vertical motion 
below the coercion equilibrium line is upward.
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Any point on the plane is subject to a horizontal attraction and a 
vertical attraction. The strength of each attraction is a direct function of 
the distance from the respective equilibrium line. If a point is removed from 
both equilibrium lines, its instantaneous motion will generally lie in a 
diagonal direction. If a point lies at an intersection, it will not move at 
all. If a point lies on one equilibrium line but not on another, its 
Instantaneous motion will either be at an angle of 0 or 90 degrees, depending 
upon which equilibrium line it i3 located on. This one-directional motion 
will only last for an instant, however, as the two-dimensional attraction is 
renewed as soon as the trajectory departs from the equilibrium line.
The analysis of this paper is not, in general, concerned with the 
nature of movement toward (or away from) equilibrium. In particular, the 
possibility of limit cycles is not explicitly considered, even though it would 
appear that the system considered here does not generate such motion. For 
discussions of these issues see May (197^).
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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a mathematical representation of the dynamic 
logic tying together coercion and noncompliance within political systems. 
Several concepts are central to the effort: system legitimacy, the long-term 
institutionalized investmént of the political system in coercive resources, 
the vulnerability of political systems to mass noncompliance, and the short­
term response of the political system to noncompliance. The analysis 
addresses a number of issues. What are the dynamic consequences of system 
legitimacy and of the political system's institutionalized investment in 
coercive resources? What are the consequences of its short-term coercive 
response to noncompliance? Under what circumstances will noncompliance be 
eliminated? Under what circumstances will it be controlled? Under what 
circumstances will political systems become overwhelmed by noncompliance? A 
central argument of this paper is that aggressive short-term responses to 
noncompliance are likely to be ineffective in controlling noncompliance, and 
they are likely to aggravate the vulnerability of political systems to mass 
noncompliance.
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Some laws secure broad support and compliance within political 
systems because they are fundamental to the social order. Murder, extortion, 
theft, and kidnapping are broadly conceived as socially deviant behaviors, at 
least in nonrevolutionary circumstances, and the prohibition of these 
activities generates little controversy. In contrast, most political systems 
address an entirely different set of problems with respect to the enforcement 
of unpopular laws —  laws that proscribe activities not seen as deviant by 
large parts of the population. These laws are much more controversial 
because, in one way or another, the public disputes their validity. The 
enumeration of such laws is lengthy, and forbidden activities under various 
regimes range from (1) speeding on highways and smoking marijuana to (2) 
exercising free speech and participating in political assemblies. Unpopular 
laws are distinguished not by the seriousness of the activity they forbid, but 
rather by the level of public resistance they provoke. These laws generate an 
important political dimension because they involve the clashing interests of 
citizens and political systems. They produce a potential confrontation 
between the coercive power of the state and noncompliance on the part of the 
public.
This relationship between coercion and compliance is fundamental to 
politics, and to the viability of political systems. The maintenance of order 
and the survival of political systems require large scale compliance with 
politically established norms and legal mandates, and the state's coercive
2capacity is a central ingredient in securing compliance. Of course, citizens 
need not always be coerced, even to obey unpopular laws. Compliance is also 
secured voluntarily, absent even the threat of sanctions for noncompliance, 
and therein lies the central ingredient of system legitimacy. Furthermore, 
the coercive capacity of the state is limited, especially in democratic 
regimes, but also in political systems lacking popular control. At some level 
of noncompliance the coercive response of the state must reach its maximum and 
decline. In a democratic regime this is the very definition for popular 
control, and in a non-democratic regime it ia the definition for revolution.
This paper represents the relationship between coercion and 
compliance in the form of a mathematical model. The model incorporates 
elements that are both dynamic and simultaneous in timing. The 
interdependence between coercion and compliance is viewed as a process that 
unfolds in time. Levels of coercion are preconditioned by previous levels of 
noncompliance, while levels of compliance are preconditioned by previous 
levels of coercion.
The mathematical representation is, in turn, employed to address 
several questions: Why do some efforts at enforcing unpopular laws fail, 
while others succeed? To what extent is success a function of system 
legitimacy and the response by citizens to sanctions for noncompliance? To 
what extent is success a function of the political system's long-term 
investment in coercive resources, and of its short-term coercive response to 
noncompliance? Under what circumstances can a political system obtain 
compliance with unpopular laws absent significant coercion? Finally, what are 
the strategic consequences of the limitations upon coercion as a strategy for 
securing compliance? How do these limitations affect the relationship between 
coercion and noncompliance, and the exercise of coercion by political systems?
3A Characterization of Compliance
Why do people break laws? More importantly, why do some people quit 
obeying laws, and why do others quit breaking them? First, some people obey 
laws because they are laws, regardless of any penalties that might be levied 
against law breakers, and regardless of any benefits that might be obtained 
from noncompliance. Thus, there is some limit upon noncompliance under normal 
circumstances, and this limit is defined here as L: the proportion of 
citizens who might refuse to comply with a particular law (Likens and Kohfeld, 
1983). Legitimacy is defined as the proportion who would never break the law 
under normal circumstances, 1-L.
citizens who disobey the law at time t. It follows that the proportion of 
citizens eligible to become noncompliers at the next instant in time is equal
currently obeying it. Thus L is defined as being fixed in time, while N. 
varies through time. (In the dynamic representations of this paper, time 
subscripts are maintained on system states to emphasize the fact that they 
vary with time, and to call attention to the time invariant model parameters. 
All rates of change are instantaneous, however, and no time delays are built 
into the system.)
law abiding citizens are more willing to become lawbreakers to the extent that 
breaking a particular law is profitable, and the profitability of breaking a 
particular law is conceived as being constant in time (a). This is not to say 
that profitability is constant across crimes or across individuals. It is 
generally more profitable to break a speed law on a trip across Wyoming than
Who then might become noncompliers? Let denote the proportion of
proportion of citizens who might break the law, but who are
Compilers become noncompliers for two interdependent reasons: First,
4it is to break a speed law on a trip to the grocery. Similarly it is more 
profitable for the employee who is late for work to break a speed law than it 
is for the employee who is on time- Thus the profitability of noncompliance 
(a) is defined as an average within a population relative to a particular law.
Profitability derives from numerous sources: some rioters steal 
color televisions from department stores in order to enjoy football games, 
while others enjoy the release of pent-up fury, while still others view their 
involvement as an instrumental act aimed at bringing down an oppressive 
political system. Indeed, economic analyses of compliance occupy a prominent 
place in the literature on crime and deterrence. A seminal work is that of 
Becker (1968), in which he argues that " . . .  a useful theory of criminal 
behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie, psychological 
inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend the 
economists usual analysis of choice" (p. 170).
Profitability is not the only reason that law abiding citizens become 
law breakers, however. The individual level transformation from obeying to 
breaking the law is also more likely to occur if the general level of 
noncompliance is higher. Two different micro-level premises support this 
assertion. First, the rationally calculating, football-loving rioter might 
decide that it is safer to steal the television if many other people are 
stealing televisions, stereos and so forth. That is, the probability of 
individual apprehension decreases as the aggregate level of noncompliance 
increases (Granovetter, 1978). Thus, a social choice interpretation of 
individual behavior can be called upon to support the assertion that people 
are more likely to disobey a law to the extent that others also disobey the 
law.
5Second, the importance of aggregate noncompliance for the individual 
decision to disobey a law might also be supported on the basis of a social 
structural interpretation of individual behavior. Some forms of noncompliance 
may be furthered through social interaction and social persuasion, and in 
these instances aggregate noncompliance is important as a source of social 
influence. At one extreme, revolutionary success requires revolutionary 
solidarity, and thus the revolution proceeds (diffuses) as revolutionaries are 
able to convert nonrevolutionaries. At some point, even many unwilling 
revolutionaries may be swept along by the social tide as the level of 
revolutionary activity increases. (For complementary analyses see Przeworski 
1974, Tilly 1978, and DeNardo 1985: 45-46.)
Barry (1970) and Salert (1976) show that considerable difficulties 
occur when collective revolutionary activity is conceived in terms of 
individually based, maximizing behavior in the tradition of Olson (1971).
These problems do not affect the present representation, however. The form of 
the model allows for either a social choice interpretation, or a social 
structure interpretation. One or the other will be more or less appropriate 
depending upon the form of noncompliance being considered. The important 
point is that both sets of micro-level premises support the importance of 
aggregate noncompliance as a factor affecting the individual's decision 
regarding compliance.
These two factors —  profitability and aggregate noncompliance —  are 
combined interactively as a product to form a rate at which compilers become 
noncompliers: aN^ .. ¿nd thus the increase in noncompliance is defined as: 
aNt(L - Nt).
Why do law breakers become law abiding citizens? They respond to the 
coercive sanctions of the state, either because they are apprehended and
6punished, or because they fear such apprehension. These coercive sanctions 
may usefully be conceived as two separate components: the resources available 
to the coercive apparatus, and the effectiveness of the coercive apparatus.
For example, Tsar Nicholas I invested heavily in coercive resources to silence 
the Decembrists and other political critics, but the effort was undermined by 
the ineffectiveness of the coercive apparatus. The effectiveness of the 
state's coercive effort is determined by a variety of factors: corruption 
within the system, institutional inefficiency, constitutional safeguards for 
citizens, and in the case of Russia's Third Section, the assignment of 
mutually contradictory and impossible tasks (Monas, 1961). These factors tend 
to be deeply ingrained within particular political systems, and thus 
effectiveness is treated as being constant in time with respect to a 
particular law (b).
In contrast, coercive resources are highly variable across time. A 
typical short-term response to higher levels of noncomplianee is additional 
investment in coercive resources. Thus, coercive resources are defined 
relative to time as P and the rate at which noncompliers become compilers is 
defined as an interaction between these two factors, written as the simple 
product: bP^. This means, in turn, that the decrease in noncompliance is 
represented as: bP jj .
v t
As the works of Gurr (1970: chap. 8) and Salert and Sprague (1980) 
demonstrate, the public is not always encouraged to comply by increased levels 
of coercion. Increased coercion is capable of provoking outrage rather than 
restraint, thereby producing increased levels of noncompliance. This 
possibility generates important analytic consequences, but the focus of the 
present effort is upon variations in the response of the political system to 
noncompliance, rather than variations in the response of citizens to coercion.
7Exploring both types of variations simultaneously lies beyond the bounds of 
this paper, and the present effort must be understood subject to the 
assumption that noncompliance is discouraged by increased coercion.
In summary, the net rate of change in noncompliance relative to time 
(dN^/dt) is represented as the increase in noncompliance minus the decrease in 
noncompliance, or:
dNt/dt = aNt(L-Nt) - bPfcNt. (1)
A Characterization of Coercion
What factors give rise to changes in the resource level devoted by 
the political system to coercion? Two are addressed here: the political 
system's response to noncompliance, and the political system's coercive 
resource potential.
How does the political system respond to noncompliance? The typical 
short-term response of the coercive apparatus is to increase the level of 
resources devoted to coercion: as noncompliance increases, so do coercive 
resources. When the police chief, or the F.B.I. director, or the head of the 
secret police is faced with higher levels of law breaking, a first response is 
to increase resources in an effort to enforce the law. Different political 
systems demonstrate different levels of sensitivity toward noncompliance, and 
sensitivity varies across different laws. Thus the marginal effect of 
noncompliance upon the coercive response of the law enforcement agency varies 
in magnitude but it is always positive. This effect upon the law enforcement 
agency may be written as/ dN^f where d Characterizes the level of sensitivity 
shown by a particular political syefeenrtoward a particular crime.
The normal response of^the law enforcement agency is, however, always 
mediated by the larger political system, and by the magnitude of
iu w  t A  i r *
(4) at**- 1 C ^ x / is i i r f  !
8noncompliance. Consider the case of marijuana laws: as marijuana law 
violations increase, efforts to enforce those laws increase as well, but at 
some point further coercive efforts become unfeasible. And thus, at some 
times and in some places, the enforcement effort is overwhelmed and aborted: 
a vivid example being rock concerts after the mid 1960s.
Interesting evidence along these lines comes from the work of 
Kuklinski and Stanga (1979). In a convincing analysis of California superior 
courts they show that sentencing severity in county marijuana cases changed as 
a function of the county vote in a state-wide marijuana initative. Counties 
that voted more heavily to remove criminal penalties for the personal use of 
marijuana were likely to realize reduced sentencing severity on the part of 
superior court judges. From the available evidence it is impossible to 
determine whether this relationship is due to (1) the potential for 
noncompliance, or (2) reduced levels of legitimacy. The important point is 
that the political system regularly intervenes to retreat from the enforcement 
of its own laws as the direct result of public behavior that undermines the 
enforcement effort.
Once again, it is important to make clear the point that such a 
retreat is not only relevant to laws that are peripheral to the survival of 
political systems. Even repressive regimes come up against limits in their 
ability to enforce unpopular laws, even when the laws are central to the 
continuation of the regime. (Witness the recent examples of South Korea, and 
the Phillipines under Marcos.) As a limiting case, even the most repressive 
regime can no longer enforce repressive laws when no one is willing to operate 
the instruments of repression.
In summary, mass noncompliance is capable of producing less rather 
than more coerciveness on the part of the political system, and thus it is
9reasonable to define a noncompliance saturation factor. At levels of 
noncompliance below the saturation point, M, higher levels of noncompliance 
produce more coercion, albeit at a decreasing rate. At levels of 
noncompliance above the saturation point, higher levels of noncompliance 
produce lower levels of coercion at an increasing rate. Thus M measures a 
system's insulation from noncompliance: Low levels for M indicate a political 
system that is easily saturated by noncompliance. High levels for M indicate 
a political system that is not easily dissuaded from its effort to enforce 
compliance —  a system that can withstand high levels of noncompliance without 
being saturated and forced to abort its enforcement effort.
This is not to suggest that mass noncompliance always leads to a 
decrease in coerciveness —  one has only to recall the practice of the 
Pinochet regime in imprisoning thousands of its opponents in a soccer stadium. 
At the same time, however, even the most repressive regimes are likely to have 
at least theoretical limits to their coercive potential. There is a point of 
noncompliance beyond which the state must retreat from its efforts to enforce 
its own laws, and thus it must constrain the efforts of the law enforcement 
agencies. As a practical matter, for many regimes, these limits may lie 
beyond the realm of the probable. In terms of the model being constructed 
here, M might be very large.
These observations may be combined into the following symbolic 
representation of the general effect of noncompliance upon the rate at which 
coercive resources change: dN^(H-N^), where M characterizes the level of 
noncompliance that saturates the capabilities of the system, and d denotes the 
sensitivity of the political system to noncompliance. Thus, the general 
effect of noncompliance is specified as being the interdependent product of
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(1) the normal response of law enforcement agencies to noncompliance, and (2) 
the political system's noncompliance saturation point.
The parameter M is measured in the same metric as N. ; As 
approaches M from below, the effect on coercion goes from positive to zero.
As Nj. becomes increasingly larger than H, the effect on coercion becomes 
increasingly negative. The size of M is crucial: Democratic regimes and laws 
that are peripheral to the survival of political systems lead to small values 
for M, while totalitarian regimes and laws crucial to a system's survival lead 
to large values. If all else is equal, democratic systems should be 
overwhelmed by lower levels of noncompliance. Breaking a law is, in a sense, 
another form of political expression and democracies are by definition more 
responsive to popular control. Similarly, if all else is equal, noncompliant 
behavior which threatens the survival of a regime will produce larger values 
for M. Thus, just as with d, M is crime or offense specific.
The coercive response of the political system is not only constrained 
by mass behavior, it is also constrained by the availability of resources. No 
political system has unlimited resources, and the coercive function of the 
political system must compete with other functions for the resources that are 
available. Borrowing from the vocabulary of the budgeting literature, 
political systems develop conceptions of "fair shares" in the distribution of 
resources (Wildavsky, 197- All else being equal, an agency or function that 
receives more than its "fair share" will have its allocation lowered, and one 
that receives less will have its allocation raised.
The level of attentiveness to resource shares is likely to vary 
across political systems and functions. A political system that is fiscally 
strained must pay great heed to fair shares because it cannot afford to do 
otherwise. At the same time, a system that is very aggressive in its
11
attitudes toward law enforcement will be less likely to pay much attention to 
fair shares when the coercive function is being considered.
These observations are summarized as a resource strain factor, and 
the effect of resource strain upon the rate at which coercive resources change 
may be represented as: f(S-P^_)t where S characterizes the equilibrium level of 
resources devoted to coercion in the absence of noncompliance, and f indexes 
the resource sensitivity of the political system as it affects law 
enforcement.
The status of S requires extended attention. Because S is the 
equilibrium level of coercive resources absent noncompliance, it is directly 
interpreted as the coercive function's fair share of political system 
resources, determined internally by the political system. That is, S 
represents a fundamental, enduring, before the fact committment to the 
coercive function on the part of the political system. And thus S is 
accurately defined as the system's investment in preemptive coercion. For 
some laws S will be very high, and for others it will be very low. A system's 
investment in preemptive coercion also depends upon the nature of the system: 
open societies spend less on preemptive coercion than closed societies.
The importance of S as a practical matter is largely a function of f. 
Larger values of f —  higher levels of resource sensitivity or resource strain
—  make it (1) more difficult for P^_ to exceed S, and (2) lead to faster 
returns toward S in the event that P ia pushed above S by higher levels of 
noncompliance. (See Cortes Przeworski, and Sprague (1974) and Huckfeldt 
(1983) for discussions of response time and system memory.)
This description of the coercive logic may be summarized in three 
statements. First, the normal short-term response by law enforcement agencies 
to higher levels of noncompliance is an increased effort to enforce the law.
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Second, this normal response is mediated by the larger political system, so 
that increases in noncompliance beyond some saturation point force the 
political system to curtail its enforcement effort. Third, political systems 
establish basic, long-term committments of resources to the coercive function, 
and they make some attempt to keep short-term expenditures in line with those 
allocations.
These statements are translated into a mathematical form as: dP,/dt = 
®t^ t* w^ere dPfc/dt is the instantaneous change in coercive resources relative 
to time and R^. denotes the time dependent rate operating upon coercive 
resources. This rate may be, in turn, expressed as an additive function of 
resource strain and the short-term response to noncompliance. Thus,
dPt/dt = [f(S-Pt) + dHt(M-Nt)]Pt. (2)
The logic of the dynamic interdependence between coercion and 
compliance is contained in Eqs. 1 and 2. The mathematical form of this 
argument lies in a social science tradition that traces to Richardson*s (1960) 
analysis of arms races (also see: Gillespie, Zinnes, Tahim, Schrodt, and 
Rubison, 1977)» and a life science tradition that traces to the early work of 
Lotka and Volterra and the more recent and very useful work of Rosenzweig and 
MacArthur (1963), Rosenzweig (1969), Maynard Smith (1974), May (1974) and 
Gilpin (1975). Because the model's systems states are coupled in their 
movement through time, the model must be analyzed in a manner taking account 
of this simultaneity.
The Analytic Framework
A framework is established in this section for the analysis of the 
model. First, system equilibria are defined for the relationship between
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coercion and noncompliance. Second, a method is outlined for determining 
dynamics and stability in the relationship between coercion and noncompliance.
A central conceptual device for a dynamic system such as that 
portrayed in Eqs. 1 and 2 is equilibrium: the point at which change is 
absent, both in terms of coercion and in terms of noncompliance. A systematic 
consideration of various equilibria is furthered by restating the model as: 
dNt/dt = [a(L-Nfc) - bPt]Nt (3)
dpt/dt = [f(S-Pt) + dMNt - dNt2]Pt. (4)
First notice that if is set to zero, then dP^/dt equals zero as 
well. What happens to N^? it converges toward L, and thus a first 
equilibrium is seen to be: E^=(l ,0), the point at which coercion is absent and 
anyone who might disobey the law does indeed disobey. Similarly, a second 
equilibrium is easily seen to be: E^iOjS), the point at which noncompliance 
is absent and coercion tracks to S. Finally, note that a third equilibrium
is: E^=(ofO). This is perhaps the formal statement for Eden —  no one has 
thought to break the law, and no one else has considered the need to enforce
All three equilibria are degenerative in the sense that one or both 
system states reach zero. E^  through E^ signify (1) runaway noncompliance in 
the absence of coercion, (2) the preemptive level of coercion in the absence 
of noncompliance, and (3) Eden —  full compliance without coercion. While all 
of these qualify as equilibria, all might also be .unstable. In terms of the 
first equilibrium (E^ ) it is highly unlikely that a political system would 
continue to tolerate noncompliance with important laws, unless the political 
system had been overwhelmed by noncompliance and forced to abort its 
enforcement effort. Indeed, if this equilibrium is stable, it signifies that 
a political system's effort to enforce its law has failed.
Many political systems aspire toward alternatives that lie between 
these three degenerative equilibria, where coercion and noncompliance are 
balanced in a manner that may be either durable or tenuous. These alternative 
equilibria are located by setting Eqs. 3 and to zero (dP /dt = dlT/dt = 0),
w t
and by rearranging the result to obtain:
Pt = (a/b)L - (a/b)N* (5)
P* = S + (d/f)MNfc _ (d/f)Nt2- (6)
Eq. 5 defines a straight line which yields equilibrium in N _ symbolized as
N*. Eq. 6 defines a quadratic which yields equilibrium in P^ _ defined as
P*. Both equations are defined in the same plane, and any point of 
intersection satisfies the equilibrium conditions for both N* and P#. That 
is, a point of intersection yields a system equilibrium.
In order to maintain the interpretation of the model, all parameters 
must be positively valued and this in turn maintains system motion in the 
first (positively valued) quadrant of the N,P plane —  the only quadrant that 
provides meaningful values for the system states. This is no assurance, 
however, that an intersection actually occurs within the first quadrant. 
Indeed, the scenarios which follow show that zero, one, or two such 
intersections may occur, and these intersections may either produce (locally) 
stable equilibria, or thresholds which demarcate stability from instability.
The implication is clear: if an intersection does not occur then a 
nonzero equilibrium is nonexistent and either noncompliance or coercion will 
be driven from the system. Alternatively, if an intersection does occur, it 
may or may not provide a stable balance between coercion and noncompliance.
Thus it is important to develop a technology that allows a 
determination of system motion in the N,P plane (Maynard Smith, 1968; 
Huckfeldt, Kohfeld, and Likens, 1982). Figure 1a graphs the N* equilibrium
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line of Eq. 5, and Figure 1b graphs the P* equilibrium line of Eq. 6. The 
trajectories shown in Figure 1a illustrate that first quadrant movement in N 
is always in the direction of the N* equilibrium line, and Figure 1b 
illustrates that first quadrant movement in P is always in the direction of 
the P* equilibrium line. Thu3, simultaneous motion in P and N can be 
determined by taking account of both the vertical and horizontal "pulls" of 
each equilibrium line. In this manner the process can be allowed to unfold in 
time, where time is represented as a path in the N,P plane. (See the appendix 
for a more systematic development.)
serve as the basis for the analysis that follows. The N* equilibrium line 
intersects the P axis at: (a/b)L, and it intersects the N axis at: L. The P* 
equilibrium line intersects the P axis at: S. It intersects the N axis at two
the P# equilibrium line reaches its maximum in P when: N=M/2. These features 
of the equilibrium lines allow the development of several different scenarios, 
and the derivation of several results regarding the dynamics of coercion and 
noncompliance. The first scenario is concerned with the potential success of 
preemptive strategies In efforts to control noncompliance.
The Potential for Preemptive Success
This analysis begins by considering two scenarios, both of which 
might result in a successful preemptive strategy for eliminating 
noncompliance. In one scenario the preemptive strategy always succeeds but in 
the other it might fail, for reasons that are not entirely obvious. These two 
scenarios are shown In Figure 2. In Part k of the Figure there is no 
Intersection between the two equilibrium lines. Thus a nonzero equilibrium is
Several other features of Figure 1 require attention because they
points, but only one point lies above zero: 4fS/d ]/2. Finally
Co
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Figure 1. Movement in the N,P plane.
A. R e l a t i v e  to t h e  N *  e q u i l i b r i u m  l ine
N o n c o m p l i a n c e  ( N )
B. R e la t i v e  to  t h e  P *  e q u i l i b r i u m  line
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not present, and motion in the system is toward: E^=(q ?s ). That is, 
noncompliance is driven out of the system, and coercion is maintained at its 
preemptive, fair share equilibrium. An intersection is present in Part B of 
the figure, but it is unstable, producing a threshold effect. Levels of 
noncompliance and coercion within a particular subarea of the plane produce 
runaway noncompliance and the demise of the coercive effort. Levels of 
noncompliance which lie outside this area produce movement toward and the
elimination of noncompliance. The alternatives in this second scenario are 
either the complete elimination of noncompliance or runaway noncompliance, and 
only slight differences in initial conditions or minor exogenous shocks to the 
system might determine the result.
What do the two scenarios share in common? In both instances:
S > (a/b)L. (7 )
And it can be shown that this condition must hold if noncompliance is to be 
completely eliminated. This means that a political system is more likely to 
drive out noncompliance by (1) investing heavily in preemptive coercion (S), 
and (2) increasing the effectiveness of its enforcement activity (b). The 
potential for eliminating noncompliance is also furthered by: (1) a smaller 
proportion of citizens who are potentially willing to break the law (L), and
(2) a lower level of profit (a) from noncompliance.
What is different about the two scenarios? In the first,
[M + / M^T^fS/d ]/2 > L. (8)
In the second scenario this inequality is reversed. First notice that Ineq. 8 
must hold if M is greater than L —  if the noncompliance saturation point lies 
beyond the potential level of noncompliance. Thus, as legitimacy increases 
(as L decreases), and as the ability to withstand noncompliance increases, so 
does the potential for eliminating noncompliance. Indeed, a guarantee of
Figure 2. Preemptive strategies.
A. C o n s i s t e n t  s u c c e s s
0  /  n 1N o n c o m p l i a n c e  ( N )
B. P r o b l e m a t i c  s u c c e s s  with  th r e s h o ld
N o n c o m p l i a n c e  ( N )
17
total compliance can be written wholly in terms of: preemptive coercion, 
coercion effectiveness, noncompliance profitability, system legitimacy, and 
the system's noncompliance saturation point. This guarantee leaves out any 
consideration of the political system’s short-term response to noncompliance 
(f and d).
Can the preemptive strategy be guaranteed to succeed (can Ineq. 8 be 
satisfied) if potential noncompliance (L) exceeds the noncompliance saturation 
point (M)? Possibly, but herein lies an irony: the potential for 
consistently eliminating noncompliance ia furthered by exercising restraint in 
the short-term response to noncompliance! Notice that Ineq. 8 is more likely 
to be satisfied if f grows in size and d declines in size. But this means 
that the preemptive strategy is more likely to succeed if the political system 
is unwilling or unable to increase its level of coercive resources above its 
fair share level, and if the system is less responsive to noncompliance in the 
short-term. (For interesting and complementary results generated using a 
different model and different assumptions see Salert and Sprague, 1980.)
Why? The exercise of coercion is risky business because it has 
inherent built-in limitations. Political systems that are willing and able to 
respond aggressively to noncompliance run the inherent risk of making 
themselves more vulnerable to the noncompliance saturation point. In graphic 
terms, the P* line declines more rapidly after reaching its maximum, and thus 
it is more likely to intersect with the N* line, producing a threshold.
In summary, the preemptive strategy is more likely to succeed in 
eradicating noncompliance if the political system invests heavily in a 
sustained fair share for the coercive apparatus, but then exercises restraint 
in its short-term response to noncompliance. Not only can such a political 
system afford patience, but patience pays its own dividends.
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A successful preemptive strategy imposes potentially significant 
costs, especially in political systems with low levels of legitimacy (high L), 
and where the profitability of noncompliance (a) is high. First, the burden 
of a large resource share for the coercive apparatus must be maintained. 
Second, and perhaps more important, many people do not find it congenial to 
live in a police state, even if the coercive apparatus does exercise restraint 
in its response. The question then arises: what are the prospects for 
controlling noncompliance, absent a preemptive strategy?
The absence of a preemptive strategy may be represented formally by 
reversing Ineq. 7 so that:
(a/b)L > S. (9)
In words, the preemptive strategy is abortive if the fair share for coercion 
is less than potential noncompliance weighted by the ratio of noncompliant 
profitability to coercion effectiveness. Statements such as these are, of 
course, relative. It is possible to pursue a preemptive strategy with only a 
small level of S, so long as L is also very small. Conversely, it may not be 
possible to pursue the preemptive strategy even if S is very large, depending 
upon the magnitude of L.
The absence of a preemptive strategy has at least two consequences 
that not a few law abiding citizens might find congenial: (1) lower taxes, or 
more resources for other functions of the political system, and (2) the 
potential for a more open society. Is such a society doomed to rampant 
lawlessness?
Two scenarios, both of which either forsake or fail to attain the 
preemptive strategy, are shown in Figure 3. In Part A of the figure a stable
Controlling Noncomplianoe without Preemption
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equilibrium is attained between coercion and noncompliance. Any displacement 
away from this equilibrium is self-extinguishing. While noncompliance is not 
driven out of the system, it is contained at a level somewhere between 
complete compliance (N*=0), and the maximum possible level of noncompliance 
(N#=L).
In contrast, Part B of Figure 3 shows runaway noncompliance and the 
demise of the coercive effort. Noncompliance reaches its maximum level and 
coercive resources go to zero. At best (or worst) this signifies that the 
political system has given up enforcing an unpopular law. At worst (or best) 
it signifies the complete unravelling of the political system.
Ineq. 9 holds for both scenarios. How are the scenarios different?
In the first instance of the stable equilibrium, where noncompliance is 
successfully controlled, it is the case that:
[M M2 + 4fS/d ]/2 > L. (10)
A reversal of Ineq. 10 will not necessarily produce the pattern of runaway 
compliance shown in Figure 3b; an alternative outcome, shown below in Figure 
4, might also be obtained. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe 
that Ineq. 10 guarantees a stable equilibrium.
Recall that Ineq. 10 is the same condition that separated the 
consistently successful preemptive strategy from the preemptive strategy 
where success was both problematical and fragile. As before, success is 
guaranteed if M > L: if the point of noncompliance saturation is greater than 
the highest possible level of noncompliance, thereby making saturation 
impossible. And as before, restraint in the short-term response to 
noncompliance is the best policy. Even if L > M, restraint in the short run 
may be sufficient to generate stability. In mathematical terms, such 
restraint may be sufficient to satisfy Ineq. 10.
Figure 3. Non-preemptive strategies.
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The important point is as follows: if a system's point of 
noncompliance saturation (M) exceeds the highest possible level of 
noncompliance that might be experienced (L), then either a preemptive or a 
non-preemptive strategy will be successful. The preemptive strategy will 
drive noncompliance out of the system, and the non-preemptive strategy will 
control noncompliance at some intermediate level. If this inequality is 
reversed, if L exceeds M, then the political system is generally well advised 
to exercise great restraint in its response to noncompliance. The dynamic 
logic of both scenarios suggests that runaway noncompliance might be avoided 
if the short-term response of the political system is restrained. An 
aggressive response only serves to make the political system more vulnerable 
to the noncompliance saturation point.
Desperate Strategies for Desperate Circumstances
Does it ever make good sense for the political system to react 
aggressively to noncompliance? To continue with the scenario of Figure 3b, 
suppose that the potential for noncompliance (L) is so much larger than the 
noncompliance saturation point (M) that no amount of patience and restraint 
can remedy the situation and bring noncompliance under control. What is a 
police chief to do?
First notice that this situation (M«L) suggests a political system 
with profound difficulties. It means that either (1) legitimacy is very low, 
or that (2) the system is very vulnerable to even minor levels of 
noncompliance. Fortunately or unfortunately, such situations are not rare 
events because vulnerability and legitimacy are likely to be inversely 
correlated. As citizens become increasingly willing to break the law, they
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also become less willing to see the political system enforce it. Thus, as L 
increases, M decreases, and vice versa.
These considerations lead to a final scenario, depicted in Figure 4. 
The two inequalities that generated Figure 3b hold for this figure as well.
In graphic terms, the difference between the two figures lies in the height of 
the hump for the P* equilibrium line. In Figure 3b its maximum lies below the 
N* equilibrium line, but in Figure 4 its maximum lies above the N* equilibrium 
line, and thus two equilibria are produced.
As Figure 4 shows, the left hand side equilibrium is locally stable, 
so that displacements in its neighborhood produce movement back toward 
equilibrium. The right hand side equilibrium is inherently unstable: any 
displacement away from this equilibrium leads either to the left hand side 
equilibrium or to the demise of coercion and runaway noncompliance. Thus, the 
second equilibrium produces a threshold that lies between successful control 
of noncompliance on the one hand and system degeneration on the other. In 
this case, as in the threshold phenomenon of Figure 2bf initial conditions 
become profoundly important. For example, if a new law is passed, initial 
levels of compliance may very well determine whether the law can be 
successfully enforced, or whether runaway noncompliance is the inevitable 
result (Likens and Kohfeld, 1983). Similarly, initial levels of enforcement 
activity may very well determine whether the enforcement effort succeeds or 
fails.
Furthermore, these models are deterministic, but reality includes a 
stochastic component that produces random variation in time paths. Thus, a 
deterministic trajectory that is headed toward a stable equilibrium may be 
pushed over the threshold by a random event, thereby leading to runaway 
noncompliance and failure on the part of the enforcement effort. In summary,
Figure 4. Non-preemptive strategy: Problematic success with threshold.
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while the political system of Figure M is better situated than the political 
system of Figure 3b, the advantage may not be enormous, and the degenerative 
outcome may be the same. (For several interesting discussions of threshold 
phenomena see Schelling 1978.)
What separates Figure 4 from Figure 3b? A double equilibrium must be 
produced if the maximum value of P for the P* equilibrium line lies above the 
N§ equilibrium line along a line drawn perpendicular to the N axis. This will 
be the case if:
S + dM2/4f > a(2L-M)/2b (11)
The left hand side of Ineq. 11 is the maximum value of P obtained by the P* 
equilibrium line, where the maximum in P is obtained at: N=M/2. The right 
hand side of Ineq. 11 is the value of P obtained by the N* equilibrium line at 
the same value of N —  M/2. Ineq. 11 is not the general condition for the 
existence of intersections between the two equilibrium lines. It is possible 
for intersections to occur even when Ineq. 11 is not satisfied. However, as L 
becomes increasingly larger than M —  as circumstances become more desperate 
for a political system —  it becomes increasingly unlikely that intersections 
will occur unless Ineq. 11 is satisfied.
Several features of Ineq. 11 merit attention. First, notice that 
this condition reverses many of the conditions that produced the present 
predicament. For example, higher levels of preemptive coercion help to 
satisfy the inequality, but a low level of preemptive coercion relative to 
system legitimacy, is largely responsible for producing this desperate 
scenario. All of which is to indicate that, by definition, this condition is 
only likely to be satisfied in a political system where legitimacy is very 
low, and levels of preemptive coercion are correspondingly high —  a political 
system that is both desperate and repressive. Second, notice that Ineq. 11 is
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more likely to be satisfied by increasing d and reducing f: by responding 
aggressively to noncompliance in the short-term, and by allowing flexibility 
in the fair share for coercive resources.
In short, the last hope for desperate leaders in desperate 
circumstances is to respond in an aggressive fashion to noncompliance, both in 
the long-term and in the short-term. But the benefits of such a strategy must 
be seen within the desperate context that made it beneficial, and the tenuous 
situation that is produced even if the strategy is successful.
Conclusion
This effort has drawn a distinction between long-term and short-term 
responses to noncompliance. A political systemfs level of preemptive coercion
—  coercive resources in the absence of noncompliance —  constitutes a long­
term response, either to noncompliance, or to the potential for noncompliance. 
It represents the enduring commitment that a political system makes, 
independent of particular noncompliance levels, to coercion as a device for 
securing compliance. The resulting magnitude of the coercive apparatus must 
be acknowledged as a central feature of any society. In this sense it 
represents a central institutional ingredient within political systems.
This long-term response is usefully contrasted to a short-term 
response: the actual level of resources committed to enforcement activities 
in response to changing levels of noncompliance. Short-term responsiveness 
depends both upon the fiscal capacities of the political system, and upon 
system aggressiveness in responding to noncompliance. The short-term response 
is likely to be most pronounced for systems that are: (1) willing and able to 
exercise flexibility in adjusting coercive resources, and (2) aggressive in 
response to increased levels of noncompliance.
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The analysis undertaken here produces a nonobvious result: short­
term restraint coupled with long-term aggressiveness offers the best potential 
for eliminating noncompliance. That is, only a preemptive strategy can 
succeed in eradicating noncompliance, and such a strategy is furthered by 
exercising short-term restraint in response to noncompliance. Short-term 
aggressiveness has the unintended consequence of making the political system 
more vulnerable to its point of noncompliance saturation, and hence more 
likely to be overwhelmed by noncompliance.
Furthermore, even in situations where a preemptive strategy is not 
pursued, short-term restraint will generally afford the best strategy for 
controlling noncompliance at some intermediate level. Only under the most 
desperate circumstances, in situations where a political system is both 
vulnerable to noncompliance and suffering from a low level of legitimacy, do 
increased levels of short-term aggressiveness pay any dividends. And even in 
these situations, the success of the strategy is problematic.
Finally, under some circumstances short-term restraint is guaranteed 
to result in the successful control of noncompliance. In political systems 
distinguished by high levels of legitimacy and by an ability to withstand high 
levels of noncompliance, short-term restraint is certain to keep noncompliance 
within manageable bounds, regardless of whether a system pursues a preemptive 
or nonpreemptive long-term strategy.
In summary, this analysis has important consequences for democratic 
prospects. Not only does it suggest that short-term coercive restraint is 
likely to pay practical dividends, but it also suggests that noncompliance 
with unpopular laws might be controlled without a fundamental institutional 
committment to excessive levels of preemptive coercion. The success of such 
restraint depends, inevitably, upon the system's level of legitimacy. But
increasing legitimacy is not an Impossible task for democratic systems. 
Indeed, it should be one of the things they do best.
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Appendix
This appendix gives more detailed attention to Figure 1, the 
graphical framework for determining motion in the N,P plane. Each equilibrium 
line demonstrates the set of points at which a system state, considered 
separately, must be at rest. Taken together, any intersection provides a 
point where both states must be at rest.
Define two functions R^ and Rn, and recall that coercion is at 
equilibrium when:
Rp = gS - gP + dMN - dN2 = 0, 
and noncompliance is at equilibrium is at equilibrium when:
Rn = aL - aN - bP = 0.
These functions do not only determine equilibria, however, they also determine 
the direction of change in the respective system states. When R^ or Rn is 
less than zero, a decrease is produced in the corresponding system state.
When Rp or is greater than zero an increase is produced in the 
corresponding system state.
In the discussion that follows, each equilibrium line is at first 
considered separately to determine the effect of deviations from the 
equilibrium line upon one dimensional movement in the phase plane. The area 
above and to the right of the noncomplianee equilibrium line contains points 
that are higher on either P or N, thereby producing a negative Rq and a 
decrease in noncompliance. Correspondingly, the area below and to the left 
contains points that are lower on either P or N, thereby producing a positive 
Rn and an increase in noncompliance. Thus, horizontal movement in the N,P 
plane —  change in the level of noncompliance —  is attracted toward the 
noncompliance equilibrium line.
Calculating movement in the vertical direction —  change in 
noncompliance —  is more complex due to the nonlinearity of the coercion 
equilibrium line. As a first step consider change in Rp with respect to N:
¿Rp/dN = dM - 2dN.
From this it follows that the effect of N is fundamentally transformed at: 
N=M/2. Increased levels of N below the maximum contribute toward positive 
'change in P, and decreased levels contribute toward negative change in P. 
Conversely, increased levels of N above the maximum contribute toward negative 
change in P, and decreased levels contribute toward positive change. In 
contrast to the effect of N, increased values for P always contribute toward 
negative change in N, and decreased levels always contribute toward positive 
change.
As a second step it is useful to divide the P* equilibrium line 
vertically at its maximum: N=M/2. Now consider the area above the equilibrium 
line and to the left of the its maximum. This area contains points that are 
either higher on P or lower on N than the points on the equilibrium line, and 
this produces a decrease in P. The area above the equilibrium line and to the 
right of the maximum contains points that are either higher on P or higher on 
N than the points on the equilibrium line, and this also produces a decrease 
in P. The area below the equilibrium line and to the left of the maximum 
contains points that are either lower on P or higher on N, producing an 
increase in P. And finally the area below the equilibrium line and to the 
right of the maximum contains points that are either lower on P or lower on N# 
also producing an increase in P. Taken together, this all means that vertical 
motion above the coercion equilibrium line is downward, and vertical motion 
below the coercion equilibrium line is upward.
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Any point on the plane is subject to a horizontal attraction and a 
vertical attraction. The strength of each attraction is a direct function of 
the distance from the respective equilibrium line. If a point is removed from 
both equilibrium lines, its instantaneous motion will generally lie in a 
diagonal direction. If a point lies at an intersection, it will not move at 
all. If a point lies on one equilibrium line but not on another, its 
instantaneous motion will either be at an angle of 0 or 90 degrees, depending 
upon which equilibrium line it is located on. This one-directional motion 
will only last for an instant, however, as the two-dimensional attraction is 
renewed as soon as the trajectory departs from the equilibrium line.
The analysis of this paper is not, in general, concerned with the 
nature of movement toward (or away from) equilibrium. In particular, the 
possibility of limit cycles is not explicitly considered, even though it would 
appear that the system considered here does not generate such motion. For 
discussions of these issues see May (197*0.
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